In short

• HSRC research shows that lower youth voter turnout reflects growing disillusionment with democratic performance rather than simple political apathy.
• Support for democracy, satisfaction with democracy and trust in institutions have declined across all generations, with some of the sharpest declines among Millennials and Gen Z.
• Young people continue to value voting as a democratic principle, but increasingly doubt that voting leads to meaningful change or responsive government.
• Researchers argue that rebuilding youth participation requires addressing political efficacy, institutional trust, accountability and government responsiveness.

Public debate in South Africa often reduces young people’s political attitudes to a single dominant narrative: that the ‘Born Free’ generation is apathetic and disengaged. It is used to explain lower electoral turnout among younger citizens. However, such interpretations risk oversimplifying a more complex reality. Evidence from the HSRC’s South African Social Attitudes Survey, together with research conducted on behalf of the Electoral Commission of South Africa shows that youth political beliefs and behaviour are more nuanced than is commonly assumed. 

A young woman at a political rally at a stadium in Soweto. Photo: Bongani Nkwinika

The Electoral Commission of South Africa (IEC), political scholars and the media often highlight lower registration and turnout among younger South Africans. In 2024, an estimated 27% of the population aged 18–19 and 49% of those aged 20–29 were registered to vote, compared to around 80% or more of those in their 40s and older.  

As South Africa commemorates 50 years since the 1976 Soweto Uprising, the political views and behaviour of youth remain central to efforts to consolidate and protect democracy. With more than a quarter of the voting-age population aged 18–29, increasing to over half when those in their 30s are included, youth attitudes towards democratic participation, including voting, matter both in numbers and politically.  

This article follows and extends cohort definitions proposed by Robert Mattes (2012), distinguishing groups based on formative political experiences across apartheid and the democratic transition.  ‘Born Free’ refers to those born after 1980, who are further divided into Millennials (1980–1996) and Gen Z (post-1996), alongside older cohorts shaped by apartheid-era conditions. The HSRC’s South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS) rounds were grouped into multi-year periods (2003–2008, 2009–2013, 2014–2018, 2019–2023 and 2024–2025) to improve the reliability of generational comparisons.  

Democratic evaluations 

Measures of support for democracy have been included in SASAS since 2011, replicating questions fielded by Afrobarometer since 1999. Across all generations, support for democracy as the preferred form of government has declined over time, accompanied by rising ambivalence and openness to non-democratic alternatives.  

The share saying that ‘democracy is always preferable’ declined sharply from the early 2010s to 2024/25, especially among the Born Free cohort, falling to 37% for Gen Z and 40% for Millennials. Support remained comparatively higher among older generations.  

At the same time, acceptance of non-democratic alternatives had increased modestly across most groups, but more noticeably among the oldest cohort in the latest period. A sense of indifference or alienation, captured by the view that it ‘doesn’t matter for someone like me’, also rose, particularly among younger cohorts, with over a third of Gen Z expressing this view by 2024/25.  

Overall, the data point to a broad weakening of normative commitment to democracy across generations. Younger cohorts tended to express slightly lower support and higher levels of indifference, but variations are generally modest, with substantial overlap between generations.  

Satisfaction with the way democracy is working also declined sharply across all cohorts (Figure 1). Among Born Free Millennials, levels fell from 51% in 2003/08 to just 20% in 2024/25, while Born Free Gen Z followed a similar trajectory, with levels declining from 38% in 2014/18 to 21% in 2024/25. Although younger cohorts were somewhat more satisfied in earlier years compared to older cohorts, these differences largely disappeared, with levels converging across all cohorts (17–21%) in the latest period.  

Figure 1. Satisfaction with democracy by survey period and age cohort, 2003–2025 (%) 

Note: The Born Free Gen Z cohort only appears in sufficient numbers for analysis from the 2014–18 period. Source: HSRC SASAS 2023–2025

Institutional trust also showed a clear downtrend across generations. This was measured using a composite index of confidence in national and local government, parliament, the courts, political parties and politicians, rescaled to a 0–100 range where higher values indicate greater trust.  

Average trust scores declined for most cohorts, from the mid-50s in 2003/08 to the mid-30s by 2024/25. For Born Free Millennials trust scores fell from 55 to 34, while for Born Free Gen Z they declined from 44 in 2014/18 to 36 in 2024/25 (Figure 2).  

Unlike the convergence seen in democratic satisfaction, a wider gap in trust levels emerged by 2024/25 (range of 9 points), driven mainly by higher trust among the oldest cohort (42 in 2024/25). Nevertheless, the two youngest Born Free cohorts showed trust levels similar to the Struggle and Grand Apartheid generations (clustered in the low- to mid-30s), suggesting only modest age-based variation overall. 

Figure 2. Institutional trust by survey period and age cohort, 2003–2025 (mean index scores on a 0–100 scale) 

Note: The Born Free Gen Z cohort only appears in sufficient numbers for analysis from the 2014–18 period. Source: HSRC SASAS 2023–2025 

Voting beliefs 

Turning from general democratic views to voting attitudes specifically, the analysis considered three indicators of electoral orientation: internal political efficacy (whether one’s vote makes a difference), external political efficacy (whether the behaviour of elected parties makes voting meaningful), and the belief that voting is a civic duty.  

Across the 2003–2025 period, there was a clear decline in both internal and external political efficacy (Table 1). Nationally, internal efficacy declined from 60% in 2003/08 to 29% in 2024/25, and external efficacy fell from 56% to 29%.  

Among Born Free Millennials, the share believing that their vote makes a difference declined from 58% in 2003/08 to 27% in 2024/25. For Gen Z, it fell from 35% in 2014/18 to 23% in 2024/25.  

Similar downtrends are evident for external efficacy. For Millennials it declined from 57% to 26%, while for Gen Z it fell from 36% to 27%. Although the trend is visible across all generations, it is most pronounced among the two Born Free cohorts, among whom perceived efficacy is consistently lowest. This points to weaker belief in the effectiveness of electoral participation among younger South Africans. 

In contrast, the belief that voting is a civic duty had remained relatively resilient, although it too showed a gradual decline over time, from 81% in 2003/08 to 68% in 2024/2025. A majority across all cohorts still endorsed this norm.  

Among Millennials, the sense of duty to vote fell from 79% in 2003/08 to 66% in 2024/25, while Gen Z recorded a decline from 72% in 2014/18 to 63% in 2024/25. Older cohorts continued to express stronger endorsement of this norm (72–75% in 2024/25).  

Table 1. Satisfaction with democracy by survey period and age cohort, 2003–2025 (%) 

Note: The Born Free Gen Z cohort only appear in sufficient numbers for analysis from the 2014–2018 period. Source: HSRC SASAS 2023–2025 

Taken together, the results for political efficacy and duty to vote suggest a growing disconnect between continued belief in the importance of voting and weakening confidence that it works, particularly among younger generations. 

Critical rather than disengaged 

To probe youth electoral attitudes further, we turn to a study conducted by the HSRC for the IEC titled Beyond Apathy? The diverse attitudes of young South Africans who are planning to abstain, or are uncertain about voting, in Election 2024. The study was based on a large-scale online survey of over 5,000 youth aged 18–35 who were either uncertain or planning to abstain in the 2024 elections.  

While the opt-in sample, collected via the data-free Moya platform, is not fully representative, it provides robust, indicative evidence of the attitudes of ‘discouraged youth’. 

The findings challenge simplistic notions of youth apathy, pointing instead to a cohort that is highly critical of democratic performance. Among this subsample (excluding those intending to vote in 2024), dissatisfaction with democratic performance, low institutional trust and weak political efficacy were widespread. However, a majority still regarded voting as important (58%), and a substantial minority viewed it as a civic duty (40%), which indicates ambivalence rather than disengagement. 

Patterns of abstention were driven less by indifference than by frustration with government performance, unmet expectations, and a perceived lack of meaningful political alternatives. The evidence therefore points to a need to reframe youth disengagement as a challenge of democratic legitimacy and responsiveness, rather than apathy as such. 

Conclusion 

The evidence presented in this article suggests that youth disengagement in South Africa is more a story of disillusionment than of apathy. Across multiple indicators, including support for democracy, satisfaction with its performance, institutional trust and political efficacy, there has been a general erosion in positive sentiment over time. This has affected all generations, but tends to be pronounced among the two Born Free cohorts.  

However, the decline does not reflect a wholesale rejection of democratic ideals. Younger South Africans continue to show commitment to democracy and voting, alongside growing scepticism about whether the system delivers on its promises. The result is a pattern of ambivalence: a society that values democracy in principle but questions its effectiveness in practice. 

These findings carry important implications for democratic consolidation and electoral participation. Efforts to address low youth turnout should move beyond narrow behavioural explanations and engage more directly with the underlying drivers of disaffection, including perceptions of government performance, accountability and responsiveness.  

Central to this is addressing a low sense of political agency among younger citizens, as reflected in a weak belief that participation makes a difference for outcomes. Strengthening internal and external political efficacy, alongside rebuilding trust in institutions, improving party representativeness, and enhancing the credibility of electoral processes will be critical to restoring confidence among younger voters.  

If this gap between democratic ideals and lived political experience remains unaddressed, efforts to encourage youth participation are likely to have limited effect. Re-engaging younger generations therefore requires not only better communication and outreach, but also tangible improvements in the quality, responsiveness and inclusiveness of democratic governance. 

Research contacts and acknowledgements 

This Review article is based on an updated analysis of previous democratic and electorally themed publications based on SASAS data and was written by Dr Benjamin Roberts (Research Director), Prof. Narnia Bohler-Muller (former Divisional Executive), Dr Steven Gordon (Chief Research Specialist) and Dr Ngqapheli Mchunu (Senior Researcher) from the HSRC’s Developmental, Capable and Ethical State Division. For more information about this work, please contact Dr Benjamin Roberts at broberts@hsrc.ac.za. The survey/project/research team included those who worked on the SASAS series and the IEC Beyond Apathy study.